The late twentieth century has seen a resurgence of ethnic conflict in many states worldwide. In seeking the management and containment of such tensions, interest has increasingly turned to issues of 'constitutional engineering' or 'institutional design 
the central propositions about the effects of electoral systems on differences in minority-majority support. The results in this paper remain subject to confirmation in a wider range of societies once more countries have been merged into the dataset, but the analysis provide preliminary insights suggesting the need for further investigation. The analysis suggests that there is no simple relationship between the type of electoral system and majority-minority differences in political support. In particular, the study finds no evidence for the proposition that PR party list systems are directly associated with higher levels of support for the political system among ethnic minorities. The conclusion considers broader issues of effective electoral designs and conflict mediation through constitutional engineering, summarizes the key findings in the paper, and discusses the next steps in the research agenda.
I. Theoretical Framework
Ever since seminal work by Maurice Duverger (1954) and by Douglas Rae (1971), a rich literature has developed typologies of electoral systems and analyzed their consequences 5 . The most common approach has compared established democracies in the post-war period to identify the impact of electoral institutions upon the political system, such as for the proportionality of votes to seats, levels of party competition, executive stability, the social composition of legislatures, and voter turnout 6 . During the 1990s the research agenda dramatically expanded in scope and reach. Newer work has extended the comparative framework to a broader universe of democracies worldwide 7 , analyzed the wider impact of electoral institutions upon the public policymaking process 8 , and examining the dynamics of system change in established democracies like Britain, New Zealand, Israel, Italy and Japan 9 .
There is a common consensus in this literature that no 'perfect' bespoke electoral system fits every democracy. Instead, arrangements have to be tailored to each particular context and choices involve trade-offs. Debates about electoral systems in established and in newer democracies, while emphasizing different concerns, share certain common features. The mechanical questions concern what designs lead to what consequences under what conditions. Underlying these arguments are contested visions about the fundamental principles of representative democracy 10 . Advocates of majoritarian systems argue that the 'winner's bonus' for the leading party produces strong yet accountable single-party government, and single member districts strengthen effective links between voters and their representatives that promote local constituency service. In contrast, proponents of proportional systems suggest that PR produces a fairer translation of votes into seats, the election of more women into office, and greater voter participation 11 .
The central issue examined here derives from Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy, in particular the claim that PR systems are more effective at engendering support for the political system among ethnic minorities. The core argument is that, in contrast to majoritarian electoral systems, PR (i) produces a more proportional outcome, (ii) this facilitates the entry of smaller parties into parliament, (iii) this includes the election of ethnic minority parties, and in turn (iv) this produces greater diffuse support for the political system among ethnic minority populations (see Figure 1 ). Although the theory is widely influential, the existing evidence for some of these claims is limited and remains controversial.
(i) Proportionality
The first claim is that majoritarian electoral systems are less proportional in translating votes into seats. This proposition has received widespread support in the literature 12 . For example, using the Gallagher index, Lijphart found that in elections from 1945-1996 in 36 democracies the average electoral disproportionality ranged from 1.30 (the Netherlands) to 8.15 (Spain) under PR systems, and from 9.26 (Australia) to 21 .08 (France) in majoritarian-plurality systems 13 . Lijphart concludes that disproportionality is affected mainly by a combination of district magnitude (the number of members elected per district) and the 'effective threshold' (that is, the minimum level of votes which a party needs in order to gain seats) 14 .
(
ii) The Inclusion of Smaller Parties
The second claim is that more proportional electoral systems lower the barriers for the parliamentary representation of any political minority, whatever their background or ideological persuasion, if groups seek to mobilize and contest elections.
The relationship between electoral systems and party systems has generated an extensive literature, following in the long tradition established by Duverger's Law 15 . Although the association between electoral systems and multipartyism is weaker than that between electoral systems and disproportionality, there is considerable evidence that more parties tend to be elected under PR than majoritarian elections. Lijphart's comparison of 36 established democracies from 1945-96 found that the level of disproportionality in the electoral system was negatively related to the effective number of parties elected to the lower houses of parliament (r=-.50 p.01) 16 . Katz concluded that PR is associated with greater party competition, including the election of a wider range of parties across the ideological spectrum. 17 In an earlier study I found that in the most recent elections in the mid-1990s, across 53 democracies the effective number of parliamentary parties was 3.1 in majoritarian systems, 3.9 in mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 4.0 in proportional systems 18 .
(iii) The Inclusion of Ethnic Minority Parties
The related claim is that by lowering the electoral barrier to smaller parties, PR thereby increases the opportunities for any ethno-political minority to enter parliament if they want to organize as a party and run for office. In plural societies with strong cleavages, consociational arrangements in general, and PR systems in particular, are believed to facilitate minority representation. As Lijphart argues: "In the most deeply divided societies, like Northern Ireland, majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy. What such societies need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority." 19 Yet the evidence for the relationship between the electoral system and ethnic representation is limited and controversial. Systematic comparative data on ethnic minorities is plagued by problems of operationalization and measurement, due to the diversity of ethno-national, ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic cleavages in different countries. Rather than examining direct indicators, both Lijphart and Taagepeera argue that we can generalize from the proportion of women in elected office as a proxy indicator of minority representation in general 20 . Reliable cross-national data on the number of women in parliament worldwide is available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and many studies have established greater female representation under PR party lists than under first-past-the-post systems 21 . But is it legitimate to generalize from this pattern to the representation of ethnic minorities? In fact, there are many reasons why this may prove misleading. Many ethnic minorities are clustered geographically, allowing local gains in seats even within heterogeneous plural societies, whereas the male: female ratio is usually fairly uniform across different areas. The use of party quotas, reserved seats or other positive action strategies designed to promote opportunities for women and ethnic minorities often differ considerably. And we also know that, at least in Britain, women and ethnicracial minorities face different types of discriminatory attitudes among selectors and electors 22 . Given all these important considerations, and continuing debate in the literature, we need more evidence to understand how majoritarian and proportional electoral systems affect the inclusion or exclusion of different types of ethnic minority parties.
In addition, there remains considerable debate about how far we can extend generalizations about the workings of electoral systems in plural societies in established democracies to the resolution of ethnic tensions in transitional and consolidating democracies. Much existing research on consociational democracies is based on the experience of Western political systems that, by virtue of their very persistence, have come to a shared consensus about many of the basic constitutional rules of the game and a democratic culture. The classic exemplars of plural societies are those such as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium. But it may prove difficult to generalize from the context of stable and affluent post-industrial societies, with institutional arrangements and a liberal democratic culture of tolerance which has evolved during the course of the twentieth century, to the process of conflict-management in transitional democracies struggling with the triple burden of socioeconomic development, the consolidation of the political system, and the global pressures of the world market. Some of the older examples of consociational democracies in developing societies, like the Lebanon and Malaysia, have had a mixed record of success 23 .
The growing literature on new democracies remains divided on this issue. Sisk and Reynolds argue that PR systems have generally been most effective in mitigating ethnic conflict in culturally plural African societies, by facilitating the inclusion of minorities in parliament and encouraging 'balanced' lists, but this process is contingent upon many factors notably the degree to which ethnicity is politicized, the depth and intensity of ethnic conflict, and the stage of democratization reached by a country, the territorial distribution and concentration of ethnic groups, and the use of positive action strategies in the selection and election process 24 . Tsebelis suggests that, although useful in gaining agreement to a new constitution in the initial transition from authoritarian rule, in the longer term proportional arrangements may serve to reinforce and perpetuate rigid segregation along narrow ethnic-cultural, religious and linguistic cleavages, rather than promoting a few major catch-all parties that gradually facilitate group cooperation within parties 25 . Barkan argues that the cases of Namibia and South Africa show that parties representing ethnic minorities are not necessarily penalized by majoritarian systems 26 . Taagepera warns of the dangers of PR producing extreme multipartyism and fragmentation, which may promote instability in new democracies 27 . Since much of this work is based on country-specific case studies it remains hard to say how far we can generalize more widely, for example whether power-sharing arrangements in the new South Africa would work if transplanted to Angolan or Nigerian soil, let alone exported further afield to the Ukraine or the Balkans. The unintended consequences of electoral reforms, -evident even in the cases of relatively similar postindustrial societies such as Italy, Japan, Israel and New Zealand -illustrate how constitutional engineering remains more art than science 28 .
(iv) The Impact on Specific and Diffuse Support for the Political System
The last, and perhaps the most controversial and important claim of consociational theory, is that by facilitating the inclusion of ethnic minority parties into parliament, PR systems increase mass-level ethnic minority support for the political system. Lijphart argues that political minorities are persistent electoral losers in majoritarian systems, excluded from representative institutions in successive contests, thereby reducing their faith in the fairness of the electoral outcome and eroding their diffuse support for the democratic system in general. "Especially in plural societies -societies that are sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate sub-societies with their own political parties, interest groups, and media or communication -the flexibility necessary for majoritarian democracy is absent. Under these conditions, majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and will lose their allegiance to the regime." 29 In contrast under PR, because representatives from ethnic minority parties are incorporated within parliaments and coalition governments, consociational theory assumes that their supporters will gradually come to feel that they have more of a say in the policymaking process, so that minorities will become more satisfied with the fairness of the outcome of specific contests, and more supportive at diffuse level of the electoral system and the democratic rules of the game. Under PR minorities should display more positive attitudes towards the political system because no group that can mobilize electoral support is systematically excluded from elected office on a persistent basis. Political leaders will learn to collaborate together within parliaments through deliberation, negotiation and compromise, in short through ballots not bullets, encouraging conciliation between their grassroots supporters.
But there is little direct evidence about the impact of electoral systems on cultural attitudes, such as satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system. Census data about the electorate can be aggregated at district or regional level to analyze ethnic minority voting patterns, for example Horowitz used this approach to examine the election results in Guyana, Trinidad, Congo, Ghana and India 30 . Blais and Carty compared over 500 elections across twenty nations to demonstrate greater voter participation in PR than in majoritarian electoral systems 31 . The main drawback with aggregate data is that we cannot establish how minority groups felt about the available electoral choices or the fairness of the electoral system 32 . If the rules of the game mean that some groups are systematically organized into politics, and others are systematically organized out, ideally we need to understand not just how groups voted but also how they regard democracy and the political system. Some light on this issue comes from a study by Anderson and Guillory that compared satisfaction with democracy among consensual and majoritarian political systems in 11 EU member states 33 . They hypothesized that (i) system support would be consistently influenced by whether people were among the winners and losers in electoral contests, defined by whether the party they supported was returned to government; and (ii) that this process would be mediated by the type of democracy. The study found that in majoritarian democracies, winners expressed far higher satisfaction with democracy than losers, whereas consociational systems produced a narrower gap between winners and losers. This approach is valuable but it is confined to Western Europe, it does not allow us to distinguish many national-level factors that may co-vary with the political systems in these nations, such as their historical culture and traditions, nor does it allow us to distinguish the impact of electoral systems per se from other institutional variables.
Expanding upon Anderson and Guillory, in an earlier study I examined the impact of electoral systems upon confidence in representative institutions by comparing a wider range of 25 established and new democracies, using the 1990-3 World Values Survey. Using regression models controlling for social background, levels of democratization, and socio-economic development, the study found that, contrary to expectation, institutional confidence was generally higher among respondents living in countries using majoritarian rather than PR electoral systems 34 . In an alternative approach, using a single-national 1993-96 panel study, Banducci, Donovan and Karp tested whether the move from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral system in New Zealand produced more positive attitudes towards the political system among supporters of minor party and the Maori population. The study found that after participating in the first Mixed Member Proportional election, supporters of the minor parties displayed greater increases in political efficacy (they were significantly more likely to see their votes as counting and to see voting as important) than the rest of the electorate, although there was no parallel increase in political trust: "The lack of change on the main measure of trust in government is particularly striking, suggesting that the roots of distrust in government lie in something other than the rules used to translates votes into seats." 35 We can conclude that consociational theory makes strong claims for the virtues of PR in plural societies. Lijphart argues that consociational power-sharing arrangements, and particularly highly proportional PR electoral systems with low thresholds, are most likely to include ethno-political minorities within legislatures and coalition governments, thereby to promote support for democracy and cooperation between groups in states deeply divided by ethnic conflict. Yet this brief review of the literature suggests that the direct support for these claims remains limited. The most convincing and systematic evidence, demonstrated in successive studies, concerns the impact of electoral systems upon the proportionality of the outcome and upon the inclusion of smaller parties within parliaments. In turn, under certain conditions, the inclusion of smaller parties in PR systems may influence the electoral fortunes of ethnic minority parties. But it remains an open question whether the inclusion of ethnic minority representatives leads to greater diffuse or specific support for the political system among ethnic minorities under PR than majoritarian systems, such as stronger feelings of political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in government. To go further we need surveys measuring support for the political system among members of different minority communities. In Israel, for example, does the Arab community feel that they can influence the Knesset? In the Ukraine, does the Russian-speaking population regard the conduct of elections as free and fair? Does the Hungarian community and Roma (gypsy) groups living in Romania approve of the democratic performance of their political system? Are Basques and Catalans satisfied that their interests are represented through Spanish elections? It is to evidence about these matters that we now turn.
II: Testing Consociational Theories
To follow this strategy, this study draws on surveys of the electorate in twelve nations based on data from the 2nd release of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 36 . The CSES uses a common module incorporated into cross-sectional post-election national surveys within each country (total N.20361). The elections occurred from 1996-98. Full details of the CSES dataset and questionnaire are available online (www.umich.edu/~nes/cses). The preliminary results in this study remain subject to confirmation in a wider range of consolidating and established democracies once more countries are merged into this dataset. Nevertheless this initial study allows us to explore the most appropriate research design and the initial findings provide new insights into the critical choices embedded in electoral system design.
Measuring Political Support & Core Hypotheses
What is the best way to measure the concept of 'support for the political system'? Elsewhere, building on the Eastonian framework, I have argued that this is essentially multidimensional and so cannot be tapped reliably using single measures, for example of political trust. This approach distinguishes between five levels of support ranging from the most abstract and diffuse level, measured by support for the political community like the nation-state, down through support for democratic values, for the political regime, for political institutions, and for political actors. In this view, citizens can logically distinguish between levels, for example trusting their local representative and yet having little confidence in parliament as an institution, or approving of democratic ideals but still criticizing of the performance of their government, and so on 37 .
Following this logic, four alternative indicators of political support were used for the analysis. Specific support was measured by perceptions of the fairness of the electoral system; the most direct evaluation of how well the election was seen to work. Responses to this could be expected to be colored by the outcome of the specific campaign under analysis, for example by the party that won office. Diffuse support, understood to indicate more general approval of the political system as a whole, was measured by general satisfaction with the democratic process. It would remain consistent to approve of how the last election worked and still to remain dissatisfied with how democracy performed in general, or vice versa. The diffuse sense that citizens could influence the political process was tapped by measures of political efficacy. Lastly, voting turnout was compared as a critical indicator of involvement in the specific election. Factor analysis (not reported here) revealed that these items fell into two principle dimensions: the 'approval' dimension meant that perceptions of the fairness of the electoral system were closely related to general satisfaction with democracy, while the 'participation' dimension meant that political efficacy was closely related to electoral turnout. Details of the items used in the analysis are listed under Table 4 .
Survey evidence provides direct insights into political attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy or feelings of political efficacy but at the same time it remains difficult to compare ethnic minorities directly across a diverse range of societies. Multiple factors can influence specific and diffuse levels of support for the political system, including perceptions of government performance, cultural values, and general levels of interpersonal trust and social capital, as well as the standard predictors of political attitudes at individual-level, such as age, education, class and gender 38 . Even with suitable controls, given a limited range of countries it becomes impossible to isolate and disentangle the impact of the electoral system from all these other factors.
Yet what we can compare is the relative gap in majority-minority political support within each nation. Given the existence of social and political disparities within every democracy, in general we would expect to find that ethnic minorities would prove more negative than majority populations, for example that African-Americans would be more cynical about the fairness of elections than whites, that Catalans and Basques would be more critical of the performance of Spanish democracy than other compatriots, that Arabs would feel more powerless to influence Israeli politics than the Jewish population, and so on. Therefore the first core hypothesis is that within each country, ethnic majorities will express greater support than minorities for the political system. Support can be measured by attitudes towards the fairness of particular election outcomes, as well as more diffuse indicators such as satisfaction with democracy, political efficacy and voting turnout. Focusing on relative differences between groups within a country holds cross-national variations constant.
Based on this process, as a second step we can then examine relative differences in political support among majority and minority populations under different electoral systems. If consociational theories are correct in their assumptions, if ethnic minorities feel that the political system is fairer and more inclusive of their interests under proportional representation, then the second core hypothesis is that we would expect to find that these relative majority-minority differences would be smaller in countries with PR rather than majoritarian electoral rules. In contrast, if we find that the majority-minority gap in political support is as great under PR as under majoritarian systems, this would favor the null hypothesis.
Classifying Types of Electoral Systems
Electoral systems can be classified into four main types, each including a number of subcategories: majoritarian systems (including plurality, second ballot, and alternative voting systems); semiproportional systems (such as the single transferable vote, the cumulative vote, and the limited vote); proportional representation (including open and closed party lists using largest remainders and highest averages formula); and, mixed systems (as in Taiwan and Ukraine combining majoritarian and proportional elements) 39 . Worldwide about half of all countries and territories use majoritarian electoral systems while one third use proportional party lists, and the remainder are semi-proportional or mixed (see Table 1 ). As discussed earlier, the way these systems translate votes into seats varies according to a number of key dimensions; the most important concern district magnitude, ballot structures, effective thresholds, malapportionment, assembly size, and the use of open/closed lists. Within PR systems, for example, the combination of a national constituency and low minimum vote threshold allows the election of far more parties in Israel than in Poland, which has a high threshold and multiple constituencies. Moreover electoral laws, broadly defined, regulate campaigns in numerous ways which fall outside of the scope of this study, from the administration of voting facilities to the provision of political broadcasts, the rules of campaign funding, the drawing of constituency boundaries, the citizenship qualifications for the franchise, and the legal requirements for candidate nomination.
[ Table 1 about here] At present the CSES dataset compares elections to the lower house in 1996-98 in three majoritarian systems including first-past-the-post (the United States and the UK) and the Alternative Vote (Australia). Six of the nations have proportional representation based on party lists including Spain, Israel, Poland, Romania, New Zealand, and the Czech Republic. Three have mixed systems using different formula including Ukraine, Lithuania, and Taiwan. There are important differences in electoral systems within each category, summarized in Table 2 , for example in the ballot structure of first-past-the-post in the UK and the Alternative Vote in Australia, in the proportion of single member districts and party list members elected in mixed systems, as well as in level of electoral thresholds facing minor parties. Appendix A briefly summarizes the electoral systems used in each country and the results in the specific elections under comparison. The comparative framework provides analysis of all the major categories of electoral system with the exception of semiproportional systems.
[ Table 2 about here]
Measuring the Primary Ethnic Cleavage 'Ethnicity' is one of the most complex and elusive terms to define and measure clearly. As mentioned earlier, ethnic identities are understood in this study as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological roots based on linguistic, ethnic, racial, regional, or religious backgrounds. They provide an affective sense of belonging and are socially defined in terms of their meaning for the actors. In Bulmer's words: "An 'ethnic group' is a collectivity within a larger society, having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group's identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to the group." 40 [ Table 3 about here] Table 3 shows the distribution of the ethnic minority populations in the countries under comparison. The ethno-national category classified respondents by their place of birth in all countries except for Britain, Spain, and the Czech Republic, where this was measured by residency in regions with strong national identities like Scotland and Catalonia. The ethno-racial category in the US and the Britain was based on racial self-identification. In the third category, the distribution of ethnic-linguistic minorities was measured according to the language usually spoken at home 41 . The linguistic cleavage produced the strongest divisions in the Ukraine which was equally divided between Ukrainianspeaking and Russian-speaking households, Taiwan where there were sizable minorities speaking Chinese Mandarin and Chinese Hakka, and Israel with its Arab population and Russian émigré groups, with Britain emerging as the most homogeneous population in its dominant language. Ethnic-religious minorities were measured by the respondent's religious identity, with this Australia, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Britain and the US the most heterogeneous, and Romania and Poland the most homogeneous, societies. It should be noted that this classification does not attempt to measure the strength of religiosity in the society, nor the 'distance' between religious faiths, for example between Jewish and Muslim, both of which would increase the intensity of religious differences. The last category taps the center-periphery cleavage classifying countries by the proportion in rural areas.
One consequence of their social construction is that the distinctions used to differentiate ethnic identities, and the political salience of ethnic cleavages, vary from one society to another. This greatly complicates the comparative analysis since we need to be sensitive to the particular conditions in each society, for example the role of race in the United States, regional-national divisions in Britain and Spain, or the critical importance of religion in Israel. The relevant cleavages based on divisions of ethnic identity, race, language, region, or religion varied in the different countries under comparison. After examining the distribution of different social cleavages in the societies under comparison, as a first step to simplify the patterns under comparison it was decided to focus the analysis in this paper upon groups selected as the most politically salient majority-minority ethnic cleavage within each country (see Table 4 ). For consistent comparison the aim was to identify the functionally equivalent groups across nations. Groups were selected based on the broader literature on ethnic cleavages in the electorate in each country and also based on scrutiny of the strongest cleavages predicting political support within each nation within the CSES data.
In three cases the primary ethnic cleavage was defined by language, namely Mandarin Chinese and Hakka speaking minorities in Taiwan; the Russian-speaking v. Ukrainian speaking populations in Ukraine; and the Hungarian-speaking population in Romania. In two cases this was defined by country of origin, namely the Maoris v. European populations in New Zealand and the Lithuanian v. Russian-Polish communities in Lithuania. In three cases the major cleavages was based on region, including the Basque, Galician and Catalan minorities in Spain; the Bohemian v. Moravian communities in the Czech republic; and the Scots/Welsh v. English in Britain. Racial identities were used in the United States to distinguish the White v. African-American/Asian populations. In two nations, Poland and Australia, the main center-periphery cleavage was based on rural v. non-rural populations. Lastly, religion proved the primary cleavage distinguishing the Arab v. Jewish population in Israel. In some nations the cleavages were reinforcing, for example the Hungarian population in Romania and the Arabs in Israel proved distinctive in terms of their country of origin, language, and religion. In some other nations there were two distinct and independent types of ethnic cleavages, for example in Britain the main racial cleavage concerns the Asian and Afro-Caribbean minorities, estimated to be about 2.9% of the electorate, and the center-periphery cleavage dividing Scotland/Wales and England (see Table 3 ). The study excluded the separate scrutiny of single groups below 5% of the population where there were too few cases for reliable analysis. Subsequent research will develop this further by comparing majority-minority differences across the full range of ethnic identities.
III: Analysis of Results
The first step in the analysis is to examine the relative difference between the majority and minority populations in terms of the four alternative indicators of support for the political system. The results in Table 4 describes the percentage distribution of support, the percentage difference between majority and minority groups ranked by size, and the significance of the difference examined through simple correlations without any controls. Where the difference is in a positive direction, this indicates that the minority were more supportive than the majority. Where the difference is in a negative direction, this indicates the reverse. In most cases the results confirm the first hypotheses, namely that where there were significant differences, the majority groups tended to prove consistently more positive towards the political system than minorities. In many cases the gap was substantively large, for example there was far greater dissatisfaction with democracy among the Catalans, Galicians and Basques in Spain, among the Hungarians in Romania, and among the Moravians in the Czech Republic. In five countries there was no significant difference in turnout, but in six countries levels of voting turnout were consistently lower for ethnic minorities such as among Arabs in Israel and the rural population in Poland. The only a few cases was there significant indicators of greater political support among minority than majority populations, notably assessments of electoral fairness in Israel and Spain, and also higher levels of political efficacy among minority populations in Taiwan and the Ukraine. If we compare all types of political support, it is apparent that compared with majority populations, minorities proved more positive on only 4 out of 47 indicators. In all the other cases the gap was either statistically insignificant, or minorities proved more critical of the political system.
[ Table 4 about here]
The second proposition was that the majority-minority gap would be related to the type of electoral system that operated in each country. Consociational theory suggests that ethnic minorities would prove most critical of the political system where they are systematically excluded from power, due to a majoritarian electoral system. Yet the pattern established in Table 4 proves too complex to confirm this proposition. Evaluations of the fairness of elections can be regarded as the most direct support for the electoral system per se. On this indicator, it is apparent that the ethnic minoritymajority gap is indeed reversed in Israel and Spain, both using PR. Nevertheless minorities under PR systems in Romania, New Zealand and Poland proved far more negative than majorities by this measure.
In addition there was no consistent pattern across indicators. For example, when evaluating the performance of democracy in their country, understood as a more diffuse indicator of political support, minorities proved most critical in the PR nations of Spain, Romania and the Czech Republic. Similarly mixed patterns, unrelated to the type of electoral system, were evident in terms of the majority-minority gaps on political efficacy and voting turnout. The analysis shows that there is no simple and clear-cut picture relating the type of electoral system directly to differences in majorityminority political support. The claims of consociation theory are not supported by this evidence, favoring the null hypothesis.
[ Table 5 about here]
To examine this pattern further, a series of regression models were run in each country predicting levels of political support for majority-minority population, adding social controls for the age, education, and income of respondents. A positive coefficient indicates that the majority populations were more supportive than minority populations. Insignificant coefficients indicate no difference between majority and minorities. A negative coefficient indicates that the minorities were more supportive than the majority.
The results in Table 5 show few significant differences in minority political support in Australia, Britain and the United States, all with majoritarian electoral systems. The only exceptions were the Scots and Welsh who proved slightly more critical of the fairness of the election and of British democracy, a pattern that could be explained at least in part by the heightened salience of the issue of devolution in the 1997 general election. In the countries using mixed electoral systems, the ethnic minority groups tended to be less satisfied with democracy and less convinced about the fairness of the election outcomes. Out of 11 regression models, majorities were more positive than minorities in six models, and the reverse pattern was only evident in two models.
Lastly in the countries using PR, in the 24 separate regression models, where there was a significant majority-minority difference, minorities were more critical of the political system in 14 cases, and the pattern was only reversed in two cases (perceptions of electoral fairness in Israel and Spain, noted earlier). Across all four indicators, the Maori population proved consistently more critical of their political system, as did the Hungarian population in Romania, and a similar pattern was evident on three indicators for the Catalan/Basque population in Spain. The evidence here fails to support the consociational claims, which have to be regarded as unproven by this analysis.
Conclusions and Discussion
The issue of the most effective institutional design for managing ethnic tensions has risen in salience in the late twentieth century. The rules of the electoral system, for many decades accepted as stable and immutable, have become increasingly politicized. The wave of constitution building following the surge of newer democracies in the early 1990s generated a series of negotiations about electoral laws that needed to be resolved before other constitutional issues could be settled. After the first elections, far from being settled, the consolidation process has frequently seen continued adjustments in electoral regulations, such as in threshold levels, the use of electoral formula, and the size of legislative bodies 42 . More practical matters of electoral management have also risen in salience for national and international agencies, notably the issues of the prevention of electoral fraud, intimidation and corruption, voter registration, polling day administration, and ballot counting, campaign finance regulation, and 'free and fair' access to political broadcasting in transitional democracies 43 .
Major reforms in established democracies have also challenged the notion that electoral systems are stable. In most Western democracies, once the great debate about the universal franchise was resolved and the mass party system consolidated, electoral systems seemed, for the most part, settled and enduring features of the constitutional landscape. For example, Lijphart's study of twentyfive established democracies from 1945 to 1990 found only one (France) had experienced a fundamental change from plurality to PR, or vice versa 44 . For an even longer comparison, Bartolini and Mair noted only 14 unbroken transitions in Europe between 1885 and 1985, meaning a major shift in electoral rules between two democratic elections, excluding disruptions caused by wars, dictatorships, the establishment of a new state or the reappearance of an old one 45 . In Western countries the electoral rules of the game, within which political scientists could get on with analyzing individual-level voting behavior, appeared settled and predictable. No longer. In the 1990s some established democracies experienced the most radical reforms to electoral systems for over a century 46 . Out of the twenty-one countries originally identified by Lijphart in the mid-1970s as established post-war democracies, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Britain and Italy have all experienced major change from majoritarian to PR, or vice versa, and more modest amendments have also been adopted in Austria, Portugal and Switzerland 47 .
In the debate about constitutional choices there are divisions over the ultimate goals that electoral systems should fulfill, as well as disagreements about how far different formula can best achieve these goals. Proponents of majoritarian systems argue that links between citizens and their elected representatives are strongest in single member districts, promoting accountability and constituency service via territorial representation, and the decisive outcome produced by the 'exaggerative bonus' in the electoral systems promotes strong but accountable government. In contrast proponents of proportional systems commonly respond that PR systems are fairer for minority groups, promoting inclusion and a reduction of ethnic conflict via social representation. As constitutional engineering has become increasingly popular in recent years, it has become even more important to analyze the evidence for these claims.
The strategy in this paper has been to compare relative levels of satisfaction with the political system among majority-minority populations to see whether the gap was reduced, or even reversed, under proportional PR party list systems, as consociational theory suggests. The results of this analysis remain preliminary, and subject to further exploration once more countries are added to the CSES dataset. Nevertheless the initial findings indicate that there is a complex pattern at work here, and the claim that PR party list systems are directly associated with higher levels of political support among ethnic minorities is not confirmed by this study.
Yet it could be argued that perhaps the model within this paper is too simple and there are a number of reasons why any relationship may be conditional and indirect. First, the territorial distribution of different ethnic minority groups varies considerably and, as Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova suggest, geography has a considerable impact on the working of electoral systems 48 . Some populations are clustered tightly in dense networks within particular geographic localities with distinct territorial boundaries, like the British Sikh and Bangladeshi communities in the center of Bradford, AfricanAmericans living in inner city Detroit, or the French-speaking population in Montreal. Some are living in mosaics where two or more groups are so intermingled within a territory that it is impossible to identify boundaries, such as in Northern Ireland, the South Tyrol and the Balkans. Other diasporas are spread thinly over a wide area across the boundaries of many nation-states, notably the large Russian populations in the 'Near Abroad' such as in Ukraine and Lithuania, the Roma (gypsy) community in Central Europe, and the Kurdish population in the Middle East 49 . The geographic dispersion or concentration of support is particularly important for the way votes get translated into seats in elections that require winning a plurality of votes within a particular single member district, not across the region or whole nation. In British general elections, for example, Plaid Cymru can win seats roughly proportional to their share of the vote, because of the heavy concentration of Welsh speakers in a few North Coastal Wales constituencies, but in contrast the more dispersed Liberal Democratic supporters are heavily penalized by First-Past-the-Post 50 . African-Americans concentrated in inner city districts can get many more House seats than minorities widely dispersed across legislative districts 51 . Territorial clustering allows homogeneous electoral districts representing different groups within heterogeneous societies.
Secondly, the way that the electoral system shapes ethnic representation can be expected to vary according to the degree of politicization and mobilization of ethnic populations into the political system, as well as in the type of cleavages, whether based on ethno-national, cultural-linguistic, ethnicreligious or racial identities. Some groups represent little more than a formal census categorization which may have little resonance for the common identity of particular groups, like 'Asians' in America bringing together émigrés from diverse cultures in India, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and China; other share a single predominant cleavage, like Hispanic groups in the United States with a common language but drawn from diverse national and political backgrounds; whereas still others like AfricanAmericans are bound together by communities based on their common experience of racial and social inequalities, and a shared historical heritage. As Lijphart points out, it is misleading to treat demographic classifications as equivalent to political divisions, for example to regard the ProtestantCatholic division in Northern Ireland as on a par to that in Switzerland 52 . Some societies are sharply segmented organizationally into separate sub-cultures, where groups have distinct political organizations, educational facilities, and cultural associations, while others integrate groups into the mainstream culture. Within the countries in this study, certain minorities find organizational expressing with parties such as the Hungarian Democratic Party in Romania, the (Arab) National Democratic Alliance in Israel, the Catalan Nationalist Party in Spain, the Scottish Nationalist Party in Britain, Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, or the pro-mainland unification New Party in Taiwan 53 . Yet other distinct ethnic groups forward their issue agenda as broader coalitions within mainstream parties, like African-Americans and Hispanics within the Democratic party. Ethnicity is a particularly difficult concept to operationalize and measure, and single-dimension indicators based on the number and size of ethnic groups in different countries are unsatisfactory unless we can also gauge the geographic distribution and degree of politicization of these groups 54 . As with conceptions of class differentials, there is an important distinction between objective indicators of group membership (such as formal religious affiliations), and subjective consciousness of the political saliency of these group identities (such as religious debates over reproductive rights). Consociational theory assumes that ethno-political identities are given and proportional electoral systems therefore serve to mobilize ethnic parties into the political system. In fact in the long-term there is probably a more complex process of interaction at work, whereby potential ethno-political identities are accommodated, but also mobilized and strengthened, by PR systems facilitating their organization and political expression.
Thirdly, majoritarian systems, even if they discriminate systematically against smaller parties, can still make special arrangements for minority representation. This includes the use of reserved seats, for example for scheduled castes and tribes in India, for Maoris in New Zealand, and for the aboriginal community in Taiwan. Another option is the over-representation of certain districts or regions to increase the election of minority groups, such as the smaller size of the electoral quota in Scottish electoral districts, and affirmative gerrymandering (or redistricting) for African-Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans in the United States 55 . The selection of parliamentary candidates can also be regulated by law or by internal party rules to ensure that minority candidates are chosen for single member districts or for party lists, for example with the use of quotas or positive action strategies 56 . Lijphart acknowledges that majoritarian electoral systems can make special provision for the inclusion of certain specified ethnic or religious groups in parliament, but he argues that highly proportional electoral systems with low thresholds automatically minimize the barriers to office, which has the virtue of being seen as fairer than special provisions for special groups. "PR has the great additional 57 But the existence of alternative strategies implies that constitutional engineers could achieve minority parliamentary representation either through the choice of low threshold PR systems or through majoritarian systems with deliberate recognition of predetermined minority groups. We need to take such special provisions into account in the analysis.
advantage of enabling any minority, not just those specifically favoured by the electoral law, to be represented (as long as they attain a stipulated minimum level of electoral support). Compared with majoritarian systems, PR can be said to have the advantage of permitting representation by minorities that define themselves as groups wishing to have representation as minority parties. PR thus avoids any invidious choices in favour of certain minority groups and, as a consequence, against other minorities."
Lastly, the electoral system, while important, remains only one component in consociational systems of democracy. Other institutional arrangements can be expected to prove equally influential in shaping minority views of the political system, such as federal or decentralized designs for regional powersharing, executive-legislative arrangements including single-party or multi-party coalitional governments, the adoption of parliamentary or presidential systems, and the division of powers between legislative houses, rigid constitutions protecting minority rights and subject to judicial review, and pluralist or corporatist interest group systems. Nevertheless consociational theory suggests that PR electoral systems combined with parliamentary government are the fundamental institutions upon from which many other arrangements flow.
Of course the evidence presented in this study remains limited, both in terms of the range of democracies included within the dataset and the way that ethnic minorities have been operationalized and measured. The results can be treated with greater confidence once more countries are available for analysis. If there is a relationship, it may well be one that is more complex and indirect, depending upon intermediary conditions such as the geographical clustering of ethnic minority populations, their levels of politicization as a group, and the relationships between ethnic identities, party systems and parliamentary representation. Special arrangements, like reserved seats for the aboriginal community in Taiwan or affirmative gerrymandering in the United States, can overcome some of the barriers facing minority groups within majoritarian electoral systems. We need to take account of how far ethnic minorities see themselves as sharing a common identity with distinct political interests, and how far they believe these interests are represented by parties within the existing power structure. All these factors can be expected to act as intervening variables mediating the links between the electoral institutions and how minorities perceive the political system. Understanding these issues is a major challenge before we can make any sweeping claims about electoral engineering and we need to explore this further to understand under what conditions ethnic conflict can be managed most successfully by institutional designs. Nevertheless, given these important qualifications, the idea that more proportional electoral systems directly generate greater support for the political system among ethnic minority groups, as consociational theory claims, is not borne out by these results.
Appendix A: The Electoral Systems Under Comparison

Majoritarian Systems
First-Past-The-Post: the United States and UK Plurality systems, otherwise known as 'first-past-the-post, were used in the May 1997 British general election and the 1996 United States presidential and Congressional elections 58 . The UK is divided into 659 single member parliamentary constituencies where voters cast a single ballot and MPs are elected on a plurality of votes. In this system the party share of parliamentary seats, not their share of the popular vote, counts for the formation of government. Under first-past-the-post governments are commonly returned with less than a majority of votes; in 1997 Tony Blair was returned with almost two-thirds of the House of Commons, and a massive parliamentary majority of 179 out of 659 seats, based on 43.3% of the UK vote. As the party in first place Labour enjoyed a seats: votes ratio of 1.47 whereas in contrast, with 30.7% of the vote, the Conservatives gained only 25% of all seats, producing a seats: votes ratio of 0.81. The winner's bonus was also particularly evident in American presidential elections; in 1996 Clinton was returned with 70.4% of the Electoral College vote based on 50.1% of the popular vote. In 1996 the results for the 435 seat House of Representatives was highly proportional, however, because with two parties FPTP leads to a fairly even votes: seats share. Important differences in how the British and US systems operate include the number of parties contesting election, the size of the legislatures, the size of the electorate per district, and the maximum number of years between elections (see Table 2 ).
Alternative Vote: Australia
Australia: The 1996 elections to the House of Representatives used the Alternative Vote, or preferential voting as it is commonly termed in Australia 59 . This system was introduced for federal elections in 1919 and in now employed in all federal states except Tasmania, which uses STV. Australia is divided into 148 single-member constituencies and voters rank their preferences among candidate (1,2,3 ...). To win, candidates need an absolute majority of votes, not a mere plurality, in a constituency. If no candidate gets over 50 per cent after the first preferences are counted, then the least popular candidate is eliminated, and their votes are redistributed according to the second preferences amongst the other candidates. The process continues until an absolute majority for one candidate is secured. In the 1996 Australian elections there was a close call on the first preferences, with both the Australian Labour Party and the Liberal party gaining 38.7 percent of the vote. In the final preferences, however, the ALP won 46.4 percent compared with 53.6 percent for non-ALP candidates. Again this process translates a close lead into a more decisive majority of seats for the leading party. This systematically discriminates against those at the bottom of the poll in order to promote effective government for the winner.
Proportional Systems:
Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Spain, Israel and New Zealand Worldwide proportional electoral systems based on Party Lists in multimember constituencies are used in 67 out of 211 countries, and in five of the countries under comparison 60 . Under party list PR, parties nominate lists of candidates in multimember constituencies. Voters cast their vote for the party lists and the seats in a constituency are allocated in proportion to the share of the party vote. There are considerable variations in how this is implemented in different countries including the use of open or closed lists of candidates, the formula for translating votes into seats, the level of the electoral threshold, and the size of the district magnitude.
Party lists can be open, as in Poland where voters can express preferences for particular candidates within the list. In contrast closed lists are used in Israel and Spain, where voters can only select the party, and parties decide the ranking of candidates within the lists (determining who enters parliament). In Israel all the country is one constituency divided into 120 seats, but often lists are regional, as in the Czech Republic where 200 members are elected in total from eight regional lists.
The mathematical formula translating votes into seats also varies among PR systems. The most widely used is the d'Hondt formula, employed in Poland, Romania, Spain and Israel, which favors larger parties more than some other systems 61 . The 'pure' Saint-Laguë method, used in New Zealand, is more proportional in its effects. An alternative is the largest remainder methods using a minimum quota that can be calculated in a number of ways. With the Hare quota, used for the list constituencies in Taiwan, Ukraine and Lithuania, the total number of valid votes in each constituency is divided by the total number of seats to be allocated. The Droop quota, used in the Czech Republic, raises the divisor by the number of seats plus one, producing a slightly less proportional result.
Other important differences in the electoral systems under comparison within the PR category include the threshold that parties must pass to qualify for seats, ranging from the lowest threshold in Israel up to 7 percent of the vote in Poland. District magnitude (the mean number of seats per constituency) also varies from Israel, where all 120 members of the Knesset run in one nation-wide constituency, down to Spain where the 350 are elected in 50 list districts, each district electing on average 7 members. Generally under PR systems, the larger the district magnitude, the more proportional the outcome, and the lower the hurdles facing smaller parties.
In this study New Zealand is also classified as 'proportional' since the outcome depends upon the party list share of the vote. The Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) system used in New Zealand gives elector's two votes, one for the district candidate and one for the party list 62 . As in Germany, the list PR seats compensate for any disproportionality produced by the single member districts. In total 65 of the 120 members of the House of Representatives are elected in singlemember constituencies based on a simple plurality of votes in single member districts. The remainder are elected from closed national party lists. Parties receiving less than 5% of list votes fall below the minimal threshold to quality for any seats. All other parties are allocated seats based on the Sainte Lague method, which ensures that the total allocation of seats is highly proportional to the share of votes cast for party lists. Smaller parties which received, say, 10 per cent of the list vote, but which did not win any single member seats outright, are topped up until they have 10 per cent of all the seats in the House of Representatives. The 1996 New Zealand election saw the entry of six parties into parliament and produced a National-New Zealand First coalition government. Although defined as mixed by the Massicotte and Blais criteria because the outcome depends upon the party list share of the vote, the New Zealand system of Mixed Member Proportional can also be classified as PR 63 .
Mixed Systems:
Ukraine, Lithuania, Taiwan and New Zealand Lastly, the last three electoral systems under comparison vary substantially but Ukraine, Lithuania, and Taiwan can be classified as 'mixed', following the Reynolds/Lijphart classification, combining two electoral systems used in parallel 64 .
Taiwan: The system used for the March 1996 elections to the National Assembly in Taiwan was composed of 334 seats, of which 234 were filled by the single non-transferable vote (STNV). Voters cast a single vote in one of 58 multimember districts, each with 5-10 seats. The votes of all candidates belonging to the same party in all districts are aggregated into party votes and the list PR seats are allocated among those parties meeting the 5% threshold. There are 80 PR list seats on a nationwide constituency and 20 PR list seats reserved for the overseas Chinese community. Taiwan has a three party system, with the Nationalist Party (KMT) dominant since 1945, the Democratic Progressive Party, founded in 1986, providing the main opposition and the New Party, founded in 1993, with the smallest support. The major cleavage in Taiwanese party politics is the issue of national identity, dividing those who identify themselves as mainlanders who favor reunification with China and many native Taiwanese who favor independence. The NP is commonly considered most prounification and the DPP most pro-independence 65 .
Ukraine: The Ukrainian elections of 29 March 1998 were the second parliamentary contests held since Ukrainian independence. The elections used a parallel system where voters cast two ballots. Half the deputies were elected by FPTP in single member districts and the remainder were elected from nation-wide party lists, with a 4% threshold. Unlike the system in New Zealand and Germany, the two systems operated separately so that many smaller parties were elected from the single member districts. The 1998 elections were contested by 30 parties and party blocks, although only ten of these groups could be said to have a clear programmatic profile and organizational base 66 . The Ukrainian result produced both an extremely fragmented and unstable party system: 8 parties were elected via party lists and 17 won seats via the single member districts, along with 116 Independents. The result produced the highest ENPP (5.98) in the countries under comparison, and also a fairly disproportional votes: seats ratio that benefited the larger parties. Ethnicity was reflected in the appeal of particular parties, including the Russophile Social Liberal Union, Party of Regional Revival and the Soyuz (Union) party, and also in the way that ethnic Russians were twice as likely to support the Communist party as ethnic Ukrainians 67 .
Lithuania: The single chamber Seimas has 141 members elected for a four-year term. In the 1996 Seimas elections 71 members were elected in single member districts by absolute majority with a second round run-off between the two leading candidates if there was no first round majority. The remaining 70 members were elected by proportional representation from closed party lists using the Largest Remainder-Hare formula, with a 5 percent threshold for single parties and a 7% threshold for party coalitions. As a result, 5 main parties entered parliament (14 parties in total) plus 4 independent candidates. Homeland Union on the right was the clear victor, doubling their share of seats and achieving an overall parliamentary majority, while the ex-communist Democratic Labour government lost seats and power 68 . 
